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The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy many sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

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The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads," even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

433 plant a small crop or graze their animals on the land of
199 relatives. In terms of economic specialty, the economy of
198 al-Qasr has for some time been a mixed one. Traditionally,
433 dependence was upon animal products with relatively few
199 vegetables being grown in the 'izba sector of the coast and
198 the barley sector to the south. Now, over one-half of the
241 registered land in al-Qasr is aboricultural land, and much
311 more land is given over to the growing of vegetables than in the past. Correspondingly, the barley land has decreased. The Bedouins still use barley primarily for fodder but much of this comes from the government. With the shift to olive arboriculture and government aid in the form of flour and grain, naturally the barley crop has become less crucial. But it remains indispensable for many Bedouins during this transitional period. All Bedouins of al-Qasr are concerned with securing a good livlihood. They express this idea in the term ma'isha simha, and, as I have noted, they identify it with the garden coastal sector of al-Qasr. The security of a cash economy and participation in the national economy
433 have been realized by the Bedouins. I have no figures on the
241 amount of land registered prior to 1960, but, as of 1964,
311 al-Qasr consisted of 2,000 registered acres. Over one-half
434 of this land is in the garden area of al-Qasr, and is planted with orchards. All of this land represents cash crops. Planted in between the orchards are vegetable gardens. These gardens

These gardens

433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 priced market in Alexandria.
[656]

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change, and have further enhanced the future of the program. The figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend to play down the government's role in developing olive arboriculture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
[556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

233 with the movement toward a cash economy, this has changed.
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[465] The shepherd receives 8 to 10 piasters for each head of sheep which he tends. The Bedouins who have taken up farming can spare none of their family for sheep-herding chores. If he [497] can afford it, during the dry season, a Bedouin may ship his sheep to the Nile Valley by train at 12 piasters per head. But the government will not accept sheep for shipment unless they are accompanied by a shepherd. The role of shepherd has become a very specialized one in the al-Qasr area. Few [554] of the al-Qasr Bedouins are shepherds, and the role is reserved for the poorer men without land.

241 Plowing in the garden area is done by hand. Usually,
407 the plow is pulled by a donkey but occasionally, if one can
492 afford it, a camel or a horse will be used. A man and his [462] sons handle all of the agricultural chores with the exception
178 of the winnowing process which the women do. Traditionally,
241 barley was threshed by camels plodding on it. The Bedouins say
492 that this is the best way because the soft feet of the camel do not crush the kernel. Now, however, very few men can afford [409] a camel. Threshing is done with a heavy wooden sled pulled by
241 a donkey or a horse. Tractors, when available, are used for
407 agricultural plowing in the southern barley zone. This zone,
•434 during the year 1963, also became important for raising water-
433 melons (batiikh), and this product figures to be an excellent cash crop for al-Qasr. Melons and barley can bring high profits

241 when planted in large quantities. The southern zone of al-Qasr
407 is best suited for these crops, and the tractor is necessary
434 for a successful crop.
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407 Tractors are rented through the cooperative society.
404 Local cooperative officers are responsible for seeing that all
[427] members share in the use of the tractor. But, in fact, officers and their closer relatives monopolize the tractors. The gov-
[654] ernment has allotted to the al-Qasr cooperative five tractors. They feel that it would jeopardize the whole program of economic reform if they were to dictate the way in which the tractors
407 are to be used. Consequently, the tractor, like the rations
619 of foodstuffs, has become a pawn in tribal power plays. In
404 one case, not in al-Qasr, a tractor-driver who was a member of the 'Ali Abyad tribe insisted that members of the 'Ali Abyad tribe pay him a 50 piaster "tip" to have their fields plowed. Because of situations such as these, most Bedouins prefer that cooperative membership coincide with local group membership. It is better, they say, if the 'Alshaibat of al-Qasr have their own cooperative because they know how to handle problems among themselves. The government, during this transitional period, seems to agree.

407 One reason that tractors are monopolized by a small group is that there are not enough of the machines to handle the plowing. Of the five tractors in al-Qasr, seldom were more than two working simultaneously. Often, this was a result of

This program cannot be divorced from the fundamental political aim of the government which is to make the Bedouins politically conscious participants in the Egyptian political community. The reform program, which has been only outlined here, has had ramifying effects on the Bedouin traditional systems, especially the political, and that is a major concern of this study. Changes in one structure of society are apt to have repercussions in other structures. This seems particularly the case where the economic and political structures are concerned. Economic change has been a background to political structural change in al-Qasr. Political change is historical in al-Qasr, but it has been accelerated in the period starting with 1960. For these reasons, we are interested in both the traditional and the modern systems.

Change will continue to occur in al-Qasr. This is because the advantages of cash crops and a market economy are obvious to the Bedouin. He can even have more of what has been traditionally valued if he is successful in the modern market system. He can buy a sheep for 10 L.E.; a goat for 8 L.E.; a horse for 90 L.E.; a camel for 150 L.E.; and a fine spring tent for 125 L.E.. A Bedouin knows that he must, as an individual, register his land, build a stone house on it (which costs about 100 L.E.), and learn the technique of irrigation farming. All of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are to some degree willing to do this for the *ma'isha* *sitta*, which, it

177 brings. The future of the olive tree on the coast, and the
433 growing importance of the melon crop in the southern sector
•434 will be the bases of a modern al-Qasr. The table below gives
177 some indication of what the Bedouins of al-Qasr can hope for,
434 in terms of material profits, by a shift to a cash economy.
435 Prices are approximate, and as of 1964.

TABLE 4

PRICES OF KEY PRODUCTS IN AL-QASR, 1964

Crop	Price Per Unit	Possible Profit
Barley	3 L.E. per ardab (120 kg.)	30 L.E. per acre
Melon	6-12 piasters each	70-100 L.E. per acre
Mint	Few piaster per bunch	150 L.E. per acre
Olive	15 piasters per kg. of olives	1 tree=150 kg. of olives =22.5 L.E.
	40 piasters per kg. of oil	1 tree=30 kg. of olive oil =12.5 L.E.

423 Land Tenure and Rights of Ownership
*613

Traditionally, an individual's rights in the land were of usufruct and tenancy. Sovereignty over the land was vested in the corporate secondary lineage group (see Figure 7). The territory of al-Qasr is a division of lineage space, and more will be said about this in the next chapter since it relates directly to the structural organization of Bedouin

428 inherited by a woman's daughters. The carpets and the tents,
562 [422] which are woven by women, are not their property to pass on
for they belong to the head of the household, the [illegible].

596 Economic change in al-Qasr has had its impact at the
197 level of production mode, and, also, it has affected the
198 composition of the basic family structure. One informant,
[124] who is now nineteen years old, remembers growing up in a
household composed of his grandfather, father, father's
brothers and their families. Since that time, his father
has built another house away from the family home, one uncle
has moved to Marsa Matruh and opened a shop there, his
youngest uncle has built a house not far from the family home,
and one uncle remains with his three wives in the original
house. This fission-type process is not uncommon in a sup-
182 177 mentary society, although as a traditional process, it
*613 represented a mechanism for dealing with ecological pressures.
433 In the modern case, in al-Qasr, the process of fission in the
• 434 Bedouin social structure proves to be an adaptive mechanism
also: the fragmentation of lineage property and relations is
a positive condition for the transition to a cash and market
economy. Among most of the families of al-Qasr, as market
orientation increases brothers begin to economically differ-
entiate their tasks and interests with an eye to individual
profits.

613 Written agreements such as the above are becoming more common in
675 the area. The need to have the responsibility of the vengeance group
[178] or the Amar recorded and the names of its members listed stems from the
[361] increase in the geographical mobility of individuals and separate house-
[464] holds seeking jobs with the government organizations in the area or with
the various industries in the towns and cities outside the Western Desert.
233 The uncertainty of pastoral nomadism and the delicate balance which exists
178 between pastures, animal population, and human population is pushing an
182 ever-increasing number of people to abandon the way of life which they
had lived for generations. Animals are extremely important to sustain
233 the pastoral life of Awlad Ali. Once the balance between the pastures and
182 the animal population is upset by a drought, a segment of the human popu-
731 lation has to make new adjustments. This adjustment is first made by
166 moving with one's flocks to areas in the Delta or in the Cyrenaica region
of Libya. This is a short-term adjustment, however, and cannot be con-
tinued for long periods of time. Pastures in the Delta have to be pur-
chased, and in most cases the owner of the herd has to sell part of his
[619] herd to feed the rest. The Cyrenaica pasture is very limited and re-
stricted by the strong tribal control of the Cyrenaica Bedouins, who in
general are not friendly with many of the tribal segments living in the
233 Egyptian Western Desert. If the drought continues beyond a certain time,
731 the individual owner of a herd may find himself forced to sell the herd
464 and seek other modes of subsistence in the form of part-time or full-time
434 employment as a semi-skilled or unskilled worker with the government or
182 industrial organizations. Such jobs are usually viewed as a temporary
source of income to help the individual and his immediate family live

233 through a hard year and to help him replace the herd he has lost. In
731 many cases a dry year is followed by another and many of these employed
464
434 find themselves depending more and more on their income from the jobs.
182 The security of the employment is often compared favorably with the uncertainty of nomadic existence, and many decide to abandon the pastoral life on a more or less permanent basis. But even when one makes such a decision, he usually retains a strong affiliation with his original way
613 of life. He retains an active interest in the affairs of his Amar, es-
182 pecially those from which he can benefit in one way or another. One im-
682 portant gain he might get is through sharing in the receipt of bloodmoney for the killing of any member of the Amar, and having the dues paid in his behalf. But while asserting their membership in the Amar at the time of such distribution, very few, if any, would show themselves when the membership of the Amar is called upon for the collection of bloodmoney which the Amar has to pay for a murder committed by one of its members.
613 It is known in the area that members of one bait of the Aggary Amar (Bait
682 Ahmad) have never paid their share of the bloodmoney of the last twenty
578 years, but always claim their share in the distribution of bloodmoney. Many members of that Bait claim that the Bait has long been separated from the Aggary Amar, although this claim is denied by the rest of the Amar as well as by those members of Bait Ahmad who claim their share in the receipt of bloodmoney.

613 Disputes such as these, which are not limited to the Aggary, led
675 many Amars to attempt to make comprehensive lists of all members of the
578 Amar and to require a written agreement in case of separation of a given Bait from the Amar.

613 671 675 682 first appeared, the rule has become a practice so common that other Amars find it unnecessary to specify it in their own papers.

Another new rule which is in the process of acquiring a great amount 613 672 675 of consensus among the tribal population of Awlad Ali is that of the responsibility of the Amar for the payment of the lawyer's fees for members [693] [695] of the Amar who are tried by the government (article 13 of the Aggary papers). Another less agreed upon rule is that of the responsibility of 613 672 675 439 the Amar for the financial losses caused by the confiscation of smuggled goods or the payment of money for the destruction of government property by a member of the Amar. Where smuggling is an important source of in- [434] come for the group, Amar papers usually include rules making it a corporate responsibility; other Amar papers, especially those of tribal segments not deeply involved in smuggling, make it an individual responsibility, while still others leave it intentionally with no specific rule, as in the case of the Aggary Amar paper.

613 [675] [131] The Aggary document is a relatively elaborate one. Not all Amar papers, or at least the ones I had a chance to examine, are as detailed. Eilat Aggary is the largest Amar in the area of Dara'al Bahari, which extends from Alexandria 60 miles westward to the town of Alamein. The 613 563 619 distinctive characteristics of the Aggary Eila is that it is composed mainly of peasant groups who joined the Aggary by means of tribal adoption. Of the 16 Baits constituting the Aggary Amar, only three are believed to be Awlad Ali proper. The attractiveness of the Aggary for the peasant groups seeking to be adopted by the tribal population of the area may be partly explained in terms of the location of Eilat Aggary in an area relatively close to the Delta from where these groups usually migrate.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*795 Taukra zawiya and given in an Italian translation by Judge
*795 Colucci.[1] In it the tribal sections of the Baraghtha, Tursh,
794 Dinal, and Shilmani place themselves under obligation, through the signatories to the deed, to pay the zawiya of Taukra alms on flocks and crops, to supply camels to carry supplies to Jaghbub, and to help the zawiya in sowing, building, excavations, and other works. Subject to the penalty of paying double alms they will not, without the permission of the Shaikh of the zawiya, render like services to other zawiyas. They promise also to defend the zawiya and to respect those who live in it, or who are its guests, and agree that those who fail to do so may be punished in body or in estate. Each will be for the zawiya and the zawiya for each. God is greater than any man. Those who are obedient will be recompensed by Him. Peace be to those who follow the right path.

*795 The estates of the Sanusiya Order were *waqf* (called in
423 Cyrenaica *habus*), inalienable endowments made in love of God by tribal sections and sometimes by individuals. They belonged to the various lodges to which they were donated, with the Order as a whole as residuary, and not to the family of the Grand Sanusi or to the Shaikhs of the lodges.[2] It was understood that when Bedouin donated tracts of country round a lodge they could continue to pasture and sow on any land not being used by the resident Brothers and to use the wells when
[793] there was sufficient water in them. The Shaikh of a zawiya was the legal administrator of its properties. The Head of the Order had no direct say in the administration of the estates, and in all probability only knew roughly of their extent. The revenues of
[434] one lodge could not be used for the upkeep of another, but any surplus over the expenses of a lodge were paid into a central
*795 pool. The members of the Sanusi family and the teachers and
794 administrative officials of the Order lived in the distant oases of Jaghbub and Kufra, which produced little but dates, and had to be supplied from the lodges of the coastal region. Supplies were sent by caravan partly in local produce, such as skins, wool, grain, butter, honey, and meat, and partly in money or
[431] imported goods: rice, tea, sugar, and cloth. These gifts were

[1] Op. cit., pp. 434-5.
[2] Fernando Valenzi, 'La Senussia in Cirenaica ed il suo Patrimonio', *Rivista delle Colonie Italiane*, 1932, pp. 432-3.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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sadaqa, freewill gifts, though if a lodge did not send them its Shaikh was reminded of his obligations. The lodges dealt with certain trading houses at Banghazi, giving them import orders against future sales of local produce.

This practice worked well enough during the lifetime of the founder and his sons but, as so often happens in Islamic Orders, later descendants began to demand individual shares in the wealth of the Order. While Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif was its third Head it began to be the custom, a few years before the Italian invasion, to earmark the surplus revenues of particular lodges for particular members of the Sanusi family, and these members became regarded as patrons of the lodges which supplied them and responsible for their supervision. The territories in which the Order was dominant began to fall into spheres of influence controlled by individual members of the family, the allocation of spheres tending to be determined by the maternal kinship of various members with *Ikhwan* families occupying lodges in them. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abid and his brother Sayyid 'Ali al-Khattab had a lien on the *barqa al-bayda* and Fazzan, where their maternal relatives the Ashhab family were influential Shaikhs of lodges; Sayyid Safi al-Din on the *barqa al-hamra*, where his maternal kinsmen the Mahajib family were predominant; Sayyid Muhammad Hilal on the Marmarica where his maternal kinsmen of the Sharifian Tursh lineage had considerable influence; and Sayyid Idris and his brother Sayyid al-Rida on the Cyrenaican plateau, where they had maternal ties with the important Bu Saif and Ghumari families. Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif had a lien on Tripolitania, where lived his maternal kinsmen the powerful Fawatir tribe of Zlitin territory.

The endowments of the Order in Cyrenaica ran into thousands of hectares.[1] Several lodges had each more than 1,000 hectares attached to them. The fourteen lodges whose lands were technically registered in 1919 by a mixed Italo-Sanusi commission possessed more than 50,000 hectares. The total lands of the Order may well have been more than 200,000 hectares, or somewhere in the neighbourhood of 500,000 acres. Much of the land was of use only for grazing, but much was valuable agricultural country on the plateau. Wherever there were

[1] An *Ettaro* is 10,000 sq. metres or 2·471 acres.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*795 423 springs and gardens there were properties of the Order, for such sites were particularly suitable for settlements of its Brothers since, unlike the Bedouin, they were sedentary and house-dwellers. In the semi-desert the Order owned, or part-owned, many of the best wells. In the oases of the 29th parallel and in the Archipelago of Kufra it owned extensive gardens and shares in springs and many thousands of date-palms. As it was a country and Bedouin Order its urban properties were inconsiderable: a few houses, mostly used as shops, in Banghazi, Darna, and al-Marj.

*795 361 Anyone who studies the distribution of the Sanusiya lodges in Cyrenaica will observe that they were placed where he might expect them to have been placed on a politico-economic plan. A very large number were, as I have mentioned, built on Graeco-Roman foundations, and they were constructed on important caravan routes, on small inlets in the coast to command schooner trade, and in strong defensive positions. They were distributed to cover all the more important tribal aggregates, and the principal lodges were built at the centres of tribal life, as is especially evident among the southern nomads, who concentrate in summer time at such points as al-'Azziyat, al-Makhili, al-Nayyan, al-Qatafiya, and al-Naufiliya. In other words, where the Greeks and Romans and Turks found it convenient or essential to build villages and posts was where the Sanusiya established its lodges. Later the Italians used many of the same sites for their administrative and colonist settlements.

*795 434 On assessments made by the Italians in the early days of their occupation, in 1913 and in 1919, for twenty Cyrenaican lodges of the Order it can be reckoned that their total annual revenues were about 150,000 Lire. On this basis, as those assessed were representative, a rough estimate of the total revenue of all the lodges in Cyrenaica would be about L. 400,000 or 10,000 Pounds Sterling at the 1919 rate of exchange. Of the lodges for which assessments were made, those with the largest revenues were al-'Azziyyat, al-Qasur (L. 15,000), Msus (L. 20,000), and al-Tailimum (L. 20,000). The surpluses sent to the Headquarters of the Order were estimated for only eight of the zawiyas, and in these eight cases the surplus amounted to rather under a third of the total revenues. Gen. Rodolfo Graziani

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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states that the total annual revenue of the lodges of the Order, excluding those at Jaghbub and Kufra, was calculated at more than 200,000 Lire.[1]

The Italian figures appear to include all sources of revenue, agricultural produce, increase in stock, and the gifts received in beasts, cereals, honey, skins, mats, carpets, and butter. At the time there could have been no adequate assessment and an estimate of revenue in money is an inappropriate measure in what was for the most part a subsistence economy. The zawiya community lived partly by its own labour, largely that of servants and slaves, assisted, as explained, by the Bedouin of the vicinity at seed-time and harvest. The produce of its cultivations and gardens and of its flocks and herds was supplemented by contributions in kind from the Bedouin. In theory such contributions were an annual tithe, but in practice it is more likely that the Bedouin brought presents of beasts, butter, honey, &c., to the zawiya when they happened to visit it, or when its Shaikh let it be known that he was in need of something; and that now and again there was a general whip-round for a caravan to Jaghbub or Kufra. That is the Bedouin way of doing things.

Bedouin are hard-headed people and they expect a return for their labour and gifts. The neighbouring tribesmen considered that they were adequately rewarded for their support of their zawiya by the services it rendered, for, like the Christian monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusiya lodges served many purposes besides catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserai, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, store houses, poor houses, sanctuary, and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was constantly on the move. A Bedouin camp might be anywhere. A zawiya was fixed to the earth and its community with it. But the chief benefits the lodges conferred on the Bedouin were, as the Grand Sanusi told them in the letter quoted earlier, that they and their children might learn from scholarly and pious men the faith and precepts of Islam, that they might have the

[1] *Cirenaica Pacificata*, 1932, p. 125.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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hold their posts. In 1919 they began to establish civil government in the territory under their control and to extend their influence farther afield. On 31 October of that year Cyrenaica was given a constitution similar to that given to Tripolitania, and its parliament first met in April 1921 under the unlikely presidency of Sayyid Safi al-Din, the old enemy of the Italians in the Sirtica. The tribesmen, of course, elected their own Shaikhs. It held altogether five sessions up to March 1923, when it was closed down. From the Italian point of view the best that could be said for the constitution was that it implied a tacit acceptance of sovereignty and that a parliament brought their officials into personal touch with tribal leaders. Writers of the Fascist period, when the Wilsonian sentiments which inspired the Libyan constitutions were regarded with disfavour, strongly criticized the Government of the day for granting them. Thus Gaibi says that they were bound to bear evil fruit and that 'the Government thought to present itself as a magnanimous conqueror, and the Libyans thought it a beaten coward'.[1] The Bedouin certainly distrusted and despised the Italians and cared as little for their authority in Cyrenaica as their brothers cared for it in Tripolitania. About 100 of their Shaikhs met at Ajadabiya, where they issued a manifesto declaring that, constitution or no constitution, they would not tolerate the Italians outside the coastal towns, and there only as traders. To this insult the Government lamely responded by opening new conversations. After long discussions between the Colonial Governor, Giacomo de Martino, and 'Umar Pasha al-Kakhiya, representing Sayyid Idris, and an exploratory visit by Sayyid al-Rida to Rome, it was agreed that the *modus vivendi* of 'Akrama should be superseded by a new pact, the Accord of al-Rajma of 25 October 1920.

By this new agreement Sayyid Idris was given the hereditary title of 'Sanusi Amir' with the honorific address of Highness and was created Head of the autonomous administration of the oases of Jaghbub, Aujila, Jalu, and Kufra, with the right of using Ajadabiya as the seat of his administration. He was granted a personal monthly allowance of L. 63,000 (on the day of the signing of the accord the Lira was 92 to the Pound

[1] Agostino Gaibi, *Manuale di Storia politico-militare delle Colonie Italiane*, 1928, p. 531.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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Sterling) and was allowed his own flag, the first place of honour after the Governor on official occasions, a salute of guns on official visits, and the use of an official steamer. Sums of money amounting to L. 93,000 were to be paid in monthly allowances to members of his family. In addition the Government undertook to pay the police and military necessary to maintain order within the area under the Amir's administrative control, and a further L. 2,600,000 to meet the Amir's general expenses, of which L. 300,000 was to be in gold, and half this sum, including the gold portion, was to be paid on the signing of the accord and the other half on the suppression of the armed Sanusi camps. The Italians also subsidized tribal Shaikhs and zawiya Shaikhs and they paid stipends to the Members of Parliament. Notables, zawiya officials, qadis, scribes, chiefs of irregular bands, political counsellors, and informers, were all on the Italian pay-roll. The Italians were, in fact, bribing the whole country to keep quiet. The Italian Government further undertook to act in agreement with the Amir in making appointments to posts within the territory entrusted to his administration; recognized his right to move about freely; permitted the oases to send representatives to the local parliament; allowed the population to keep their arms; and guaranteed exemption of the Sanusiya lands from taxation. It specifically and solemnly declared that it had no intention of expropriating Arab lands, privately or collectively owned, or endowments of the Order, in favour of colonists. On his side the Sayyid promised to aid the Government in the application of the new constitution; to suppress within eight months the camps and posts and other Sanusi organizations of a political, administrative, or military character in the territory not entrusted to his administration; to keep his army to 1,000 men, subject to increase by mutual agreement; to encourage trade and communications; and not to tax the population other than by collection of religious tithes without coercion.

It was felt by the Italian Government that though in this new pact it had to make considerable concessions it had gained in return a more definite acceptance of its claim to sovereignty over the whole of Cyrenaica, which was henceforth divided into two zones, Cyrenaica proper under direct Italian administration and the oases under Sanusiya administration. The Sanusiya,

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT? Libyan Bedouin MT?
(1837-1942) Sanusi

as well as Italy, had been forced to compromise. Critics of the Fascist period were later to complain that the pact was a blow to Italian prestige in that it virtually recognized 'the existence of two distinct Governments',[1] and Macaluso goes so far as to say that the making of the Sayyid into an Amir 'was the ratification of the undisputed sovereignty of the Sanusiya in Cyrenaica'.[2] Even those who defended the agreement had to admit that the Order was not being treated as a purely religious body, but as a politico-religious fraternity and that there was, therefore, doubt about what its relations with the Italian Government were supposed to be. 'Amir' to the Italians meant Honorary Prince but it had a very different sense to the Arabs. It was, moreover, uncertain whether a seat at Ajadabiya implied that the warlike Magharba tribe of the *barqa* and the Sirtica came within the Sayyid's political orbit or not. On the whole one can say that the Sayyid, or rather the Amir, as we can now call him, bargained autonomy of the oases and the hinterland for his armed camps and administrative posts on the plateau. As he did not, in fact, disband these he may be said to have had the better of the bargain. After the Accord of al-Rajma was signed the Amir visited Rome.

The accord was supplemented by a further agreement known as *Sistemazione definitiva delle zauie* of 16 August 1921 by which nomination, suspension, and transfer of Shaikhs of Sanusiya lodges were to be in the hands of the Amir, but he had to give notice of these acts to the Government, and he promised to remove Shaikhs who embittered relations between the Government and the people. The Government undertook to pay the Shaikhs of lodges (in two categories of L. 900 and L. 600 a month), to hand back to the Order all lodges in its occupation, except those being used as forts, and to pay the sum of L. 500,000 as indemnity for lodges destroyed during the war.[3]

IV

The Italians pretended afterwards that 'Umar al-Kakhiya, who closely followed political events in Italy, had in bad faith, believing that the Socialists were in the ascendant and that

[1] Agostino Gaibi, op. cit., p. 463. [2] Macaluso, op. cit., p. 100.
[3] *L'Occupazione di Cufra*, 1931, pp. 62–3. On 16 August 1921 the Lira was 84 to the Pound Sterling.